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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Sustains the
Constitutionality of the Gaming Act:
Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion
Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LEGISLATION - PENNSYLVANIA RACE HORSE DEVELOPMENT AND
GAMING ACT - The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the
constitutionality of the Gaming Act.
Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, 877 A.2d 383 (2005).
Governor Edward G. Rendell signed the Pennsylvania Race
Horse Development and Gaming Act (hereinafter "Gaming Act")
into law on July 5, 2004 as Act 71 of 2004.1 The constitutionality
of the procedures employed by the Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly in which House Bill 2330 (hereinafter "H.B. 2330") evolved
into the Gaming Act was the center of the dispute in this case.'
On February 3, 2004, H.B. 2330 was introduced into the House
and was titled, "An Act Providing for the Duties of the Pennsyl-
vania State Police Regarding Criminal History Background Re-
ports for Persons Participating in Harness or Horse Racing."3 This
bill was one page long and directed the Pennsylvania State Police
to provide the State Harness and Horse Racing Commissions with
criminal background checks and fingerprint data on all applicants
for licenses.4 The bill was then given the three required considera-
tions in the House and two initial considerations in the Senate.
The third consideration by the Senate on July 1, 2004 resulted
in the bill being substantially amended.' The amendments
1. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877
A.2d 383, 390 (Pa. 2005). See also The Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming
Act, 4 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-1904 (2004).
2. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 391. Chief Justice Cappy authored the opinion for the
court, Justices Castille, Nigro, Saylor, Eakin, and Baer joined the opinion. Id. Justice




6. Id. at 391-92.
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lengthened the bill to 145 pages and the name was altered to the
Gaming Act in consideration of these changes.! The result of the
Gaming Act was to approve the creation of slot machine casinos
throughout Pennsylvania.' The Gaming Act also formed the
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, authorized the issuance of
licenses to operate the casinos, and approved the distribution of
revenues from the casinos.9 The revenues were to be distributed
to various funds, which were also created by the Act." After the
amendments, the bill was sent to the House where it was voted on
and passed on July 3, 2004." The bill was passed by the Senate on
July 4, 2004.12 Governor Rendell then signed the Gaming Act into
law on July 5, 2004 as Act 71 of 2004.1'
The constitutionality of the legislative process in the passage of
the Gaming Act was questioned by the filing of a complaint by a
group of concerned citizens (hereinafter "Concerned Citizens")
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Rendell,
and the leaders of the Pennsylvania House and Senate (hereinaf-
ter, collectively "Commonwealth"). 14 The allegations of the com-
7. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 392.
8. Id. The court stated:
The bill as amended included the creation of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control
Board, the issuance of gambling licenses authorizing the creation of a variety of
slot machine casinos, the generation and distribution of revenues from the li-
censes, the creation of numerous funds including the Gaming Fund, the Penn-
sylvania Horse Race Fund, the Gambling and Economic Development and
Tourism Fund, the Property Tax Relief Fund as well as a Compulsive and
Problem Gambling Treatment Fund.
Id. See also 4 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-1904.
9. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 392.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 393.
13. Id.
14. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 390 n.1. Petitioners are: Pennsylvanians Against
Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc.; Pennsylvania Family Institute; The League of Women
Voters of Pennsylvania; Gibson E. Armstrong, Senator of the 13th Senatorial District; Paul
J. Clymer, Representative of the 145th Legislative District; Gregory S. Vitali, Representa-
tive of the 166th Legislative District; Gibson C. Armstrong, Representative of the 100th
Legislative District; Jerry A. Stern, Representative of the 80th Legislative District; Dick
Shellenberger, Lancaster County Commissioner; The Commonwealth Foundation; The
Keystone Christian Education Association; A United Methodist Witness of Pennsylvania;
No Dice, Inc.; The Reverend Dr. Thomas E. Richards, Jr., in his individual capacity; Mark
Kovscek, in his individual capacity; Lois J. Romberger, in her individual capacity; and C.
Douglas Rothgaber, in his individual capacity. Id. Respondents are: Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania; Edward G. Rendell, in his official capacity as Governor of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania; Robert C. Jubelirer, President Pro Tempore of the Senate of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; John M. Perzel, Speaker of the House of Representatives
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Robert J. Mellow, Minority Leader of the Senate of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; H. William DeWeese, Minority Leader of the House of
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plaint were that the Gaming Act violated Article III, Sections 1, 3,
4, 6, and 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." The complaint
also alleged that the delegation of power to the Gaming Control
Board was unconstitutional." The Commonwealth answered the
complaint by filing a demurrer, arguing that the procedures fol-
lowed by the General Assembly in passing the Gaming Act did not
violate any provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that it had origi-
nal jurisdiction over issues surrounding the Gaming Act 8 and that
the several legislators among the Concerned Citizens had stand-
ing to sue to enjoin the enforcement of the legislation. 9 The court
added that a challenger to the constitutionality of a statute must
overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality of legislative
actions, and a statute will not be deemed unconstitutional unless
it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution.0
The Concerned Citizens argued that the Gaming Act was un-
constitutional because it violated Article III, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution in that the Act contained multiple sub-
jects, including racehorse development and gaming.2 ' The Com-
monwealth countered this argument with the assertion that the
amendments to the bill must be germane to the original subject of
the bill. H.B. 2330 began as a bill providing background checks
on applicants for horseracing licenses and, after amendment, ap-
proved the creation of slot machine casinos throughout Pennsyl-
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and The Pennsylvania Gaming
Control Board. Id.
15. Id. at 392. See PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10.
16. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 392.
17. Id.
18. The Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, 4 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
1101-1904. Section 1904 provides in part:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear any
challenge to or to render a declaratory judgment concerning the constitutional-
ity of this part. The Supreme Court is authorized to take such action as it
deems appropriate, consistent with the Supreme Court retaining jurisdiction
over such a matter, to find facts or to expedite a final judgment in connection
with such a challenge or request for declaratory relief.
Id.
19. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 392-93. See City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth,
838 A.2d 566, 579 (Pa. 2003).
20. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 393. See Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc.
v. Commonwealth Association of School Administrators, 805 A.2d 476, 479 (Pa. 2002).
21. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 394. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3. Section 3 states:
"No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed
in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a
part thereof." PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
22. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 394.
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vania." The Commonwealth asserted that the Gaming Act did not
violate the Pennsylvania Constitution because amendments are
germane to a bill when they do not wholly alter the subject matter
of the bill.14 The Commonwealth continued that the subject mat-
ter of the Gaming Act was not substantially altered because the
bill is expected to undergo a transformation during the enactment
process."5 The argument by the Commonwealth was that, as long
as all provisions of the bill relate to the same subject (regulating
gaming) then the legislation meets the "germane" requirement
and is constitutional. 6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Gaming Act did
not violate Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
for failure to meet the single-subject requirement.27 Chief Justice
Cappy reasoned that the purpose of section 3 is to prevent the leg-
islature from hiding the true purpose of a piece of legislation by
inserting a number of unrelated subjects into the bill.28 The court
further held that a bill with a single unifying subject will meet the
requirements of section 3 if all of the provisions are germane to
that subject. When amendments to legislation are involved, the
court asserted that the germaneness test is met if the amend-
ments are germane to the main objective and title of the bill."0
Applying these rules, the court found that the regulation of gam-
ing was the single unifying subject of the Gaming Act and thus it
did not violate the single-subject requirement of the Constitution.31
The Concerned Citizens further argued that the single-subject
requirement was violated by the distribution of funds to certain
entities" that were unrelated to the single unifying subject of
gaming regulation.3 The Commonwealth countered by asserting
that the single-subject requirement was not violated by the dis-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 394-95.
26. Id.
27. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 396. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
28. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 395. See City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 586.
29. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 396. See City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 589.
30. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 395. See City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 587.
31. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 396.
32. Id. The entities as listed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania include: The
Pennsylvania Convention Center, the Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh Hotel
and Convention Center, various indebtedness from urban redevelopment laws, transfers of
money to the Volunteer Fire Company Grant Program, five million dollars for local law
enforcement and each county that receives payments under the Forest Reserves Municipal
Financial Relief Law. Id.
33. Id.
554 Vol. 44
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bursements.34 The monies to be distributed were generated from
gaming activities, which created a nexus between the allocation of
funds and the regulation of gaming." The Commonwealth also
asserted that section 3 was not violated because the allocation of
fees flowed naturally from the imposition of the fees.36 This argu-
ment was countered by the Concerned Citizens, who claimed that
the only connection between the regulation of gaming and the spe-
cial funds was the source of the funds, and that this did not satisfy
section 3.37
Chief Justice Cappy framed the issue around the Concerned
Citizens' last argument and asked the court to determine whether
the constitutional germaneness test is met by a source-only sub-
ject nexus.38 The court relied on Commonwealth v. Powell39 in find-
ing that appropriations and disbursements made through a single
statutory enactment must be made in a manner germane to the
single-subject of the bill.40 The germaneness test is also met when
appropriations and disbursements are made in separate bills as
authorized by Article III, Section 11 of the Constitution.4
The court determined that some of the disbursements were not
germane to the single-subject of the statute, were not made in
separate bills, and thus violated Article III, Section 3 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.42 Section 1408 of the Gaming Act provided
that funds from the State Gaming Fund should be distributed to
the Volunteer Fire Company Grant Program and schools under
the Forest Reserves Municipal Financial Relief Law. 43 The court
found that these distributions both had a source-only subject
34. Id. at 396-97.
35. Id. at 397.
36. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 397. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Powell,
94 A. 746 (Pa. 1915).
37. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 397.
38. Id.
39. Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Powell, 94 A. 746 (Pa. 1915).
40. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 398. See Powell, 94 A. at 749. The court in Powell
held that, "to withstand single-subject challenge, the designation or use of the monies col-
lected under a statute must also be germane to the overall subject of the statute if the legis-
lature is going to disburse funds through a single statutory enactment." Powell, 94 A. at
749.
41. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 400. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 11. Section 11 provides
that "[t]he general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth, for the public debt
and for public schools. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each em-
bracing but one subject." PA. CONST. art. III, § 11.
42. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 402. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
43. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1408 (2004).
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nexus to the regulation of gaming, and the Gaming Act authorized
direct disbursement of monies to these entities." These disburse-
ments therefore failed to meet the requirements of section 3 and
were unconstitutional.45 The court then severed the unconstitu-
tional provisions from the Gaming Act."
Another argument that the legislative process violated Article
III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution presented by the
Concerned Citizens was that the subject of the bill was not clearly
expressed in its title.47 The Concerned Citizens maintained that
when comparing the titles of H.B. 2330 and the Gaming Act, the
amendments were not relevant to the original purpose and subject
of H.B. 2330.48 The argument of the Concerned Citizens continued
that the change in title from "An Act Providing for the Duties of
the Pennsylvania State Police Regarding Criminal History Back-
ground Reports for Persons Participating in Harness or Horse
Racing" to "The Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gam-
ing Act" shows that the passage of the bill was unconstitutional
because it violated article III, section 3, which forbids the chang-
ing of the purpose of a bill via an amendment.49
The Commonwealth argued that the purpose of the clearly ex-
pressed title provision in article III, section 3 of the constitution is
to indicate to the General Assembly the contents of a bill.5" Under
this rationale, section 3 would only be violated if the title to a bill
actually deceived legislators or would not put reasonable persons
on notice of the content in the bill.51 The Commonwealth con-
tended that the Concerned Citizens lacked evidence because they
did not assert that the title of H.B. 2330 was deceptive as to any
44. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 402-03.
45. Id. at 402-03. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
46. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 403. See Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488,
502 (Pa. 2003). Unconstitutional provisions are generally severable from the bill.
Mockaitis, 834 A.2d at 502. The provisions are not severable only if the "valid provisions
are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so depend upon, the void provision
or application, that it cannot be presumed the General Assembly would have enacted the
remaining valid provisions without the void one." Id.
47. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 404. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3. Section 3 provides
that "[nlo bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the
law or a part thereof." PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
48. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 404.
49. Id. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
50. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 404-05.
51. Id.
556 Vol. 44
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legislators, or that reasonable persons would be on notice of the
contents of the Gaming Act.52
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Common-
wealth and held first that reasonable persons would be on notice
of the subject matter of the Gaming Act, and second, that the leg-
islation did not violate Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution." The court followed the interpretation suggested by
the Commonwealth that, to violate section 3, either legislators
must actually be deceived, or no reasonable person could be able to
ascertain the subject matter of the bill from its title.' Applying
the facts to the case, the court held that the Concerned Citizens
failed to show that the title was violative of Article III, Section 3 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.55
The next issue the court determined was whether the proce-
dures for enactment violated the change in the original purpose
clause of article III, section 1.56 The Concerned Citizens asserted
that the purpose of this rule is to eliminate deception, confusion,
and misconduct.57 They claimed that section 1 of the constitution
was violated because the original and amended titles of the bill
were both deceptive, and that this position was exemplified in the
manner in which the bill was pushed through the General Assem-
bly in three days after the amendments.58 According to the Con-
cerned Citizens, the original purpose of the bill was also changed
because the legislation began as a bill governing fingerprinting at
racetracks, and then it became a bill creating casinos and a regu-
latory board to govern the casinos.59
The Commonwealth countered that article III, section 1 was not
violated because the original purpose of H.B. 2330, the regulation
of gaming, remained the same from its creation to its passage as
the Gaming Act."° While the amendments to the Gaming Act re-
sulted in an expansion and introduction of new topics, the bill re-
mained true to its original purpose of regulating gaming.5 To
52. Id. at 405.
53. Id. at 406. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
54. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 406.
55. Id.
56. Id. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 1. Section 1 provides, "No law shall be passed except
by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through either House, as
to change its original purpose." PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
57. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 406.
58. Id.





support its claim, the Commonwealth relied on the holding of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Consumer Party v. Common-
wealth.62 In Consumer Party, the court stated that a constitutional
challenge based on a change in original purpose will fail if the bill
is presented in final form to both houses for consideration and
adoption.'
Chief Justice Cappy agreed with this description of the holding
of Consumer Party, but found that presenting the bill only in its
final form did not meet the requirements of article III, section 1.
This provision of the constitution requires that the bill not be
changed in.its original purpose. 5 The use of "change" in this pro-
vision led the court to determine that a bill must be analyzed by
comparing the original and final forms.66 The court then adopted a
new two-prong test to be applied by courts in evaluating whether
a bill has changed its original purpose.67 The first inquiry under
the test involves a comparison of the original and final purposes of
the bill to determine if amendments or alterations have caused a
change in the original purpose of the bill." The court stated that
the next determination involved whether the title and contents of
the bill in final form were deceptive.69 The court noted that, if the
legislation passes both prongs of this test, it would meet the re-
quirements of Article III, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.7°
In applying the facts of Pennsylvanians to the newly formed
test, the court determined that the Gaming Act was in accord with
the requirements of section 1.71 Under its analysis, the court held
that the amendments and alterations of H.B. 2330 did not change
the original purpose of the bill, which was to regulate gaming.72
The second prong was also met because the title of the bill was
sufficient to put reasonable persons on notice as to its subject mat-
62. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 407 (citing Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 507
A.2d 323, 335 (Pa. 1986)).
63. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 335.
64. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 408.
65. PA- CONST. art. III, § 1.
66. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 408.
67. Id. at 408-09.
68. Id. The court held that the original purpose of the bill in this analysis should be
viewed in reasonably broad terms. Id.
69. Id. at 409.
70. Id. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
71. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 409.
72. Id.
558 Vol. 44
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ter.73 Chief Justice Cappy, writing for the court, held that the
original purpose of the bill was not changed and article III, section
1 was not violated by the process by which H.B. 2330 became the
Gaming Act.74
After consideration of the article III, section 1 and 3 claims, the
court dismissed the argument of the Concerned Citizens that the
bill violated article III, section 4.75 According to the court, section
4 could not be violated without a violation of either sections 1 or
3.76 The court also dismissed the Concerned Citizens claim under
article III, section 10,77 that the bill was a revenue bill which origi-
nated in the Senate.78 Since the bill started in the House as H.B.
2330 and was later amended, section 10 did not apply.79
The Concerned Citizens next alleged that article III, section 680
was violated because section 1903 of the Gaming Act8' repealed
sections of other acts without printing the text of the acts that
were repealed in the bill.82 This section of the Act provided that
section 493(29) of the Liquor Code, which prohibited providing
73. Id.
74. Id. at 409-10.
75. Id. at 409. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 4. Section 4 provides:
Every bill shall be considered on three different days in each House. All
amendments made thereto shall be printed for the use of the members before
the final vote is taken on the bill and before the final vote is taken, upon the
written request addressed to the presiding officer of either House by at least
twenty-five percent of the members elected to that House, any bill shall be read
at length in that House. No bill shall become a law, unless on its final passage
the vote is taken by yeas and nays, the names of the persons voting for and
against it are entered on the journal, and a majority of the members elected to
each House is recorded thereon as voting in its favor.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 4.
76. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 410.
77. PA. CONST. art. III, § 10. Section 10 provides that "all bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose amendments in
other bills." Id.
78. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 412-14.
79. Id. at 414.
80. PA. CONST. art. III, § 6 provides, "No law shall be revived, amended, or the provi-
sions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is
revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length." Id.
81. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903. Section 1903 provided,
(a) Inconsistent - The following acts and parts of acts are repealed as follows:
(1) Section 493(29) of the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L. 90, No. 21), known as the
Liquor Code, is repealed absolutely.
(2) The provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5513(a) are repealed insofar as they are in-
consistent with this part.
(b) General.-All other acts or parts of acts are repealed insofar as they are in-
consistent with this part."
Id.
82. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 410-11.
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alcohol to customers for free or below cost, was repealed. 3 The
section of repealed text was not published in the Gaming Act."
The Concerned Citizens complaint also alleged that a provision of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,85 which made slot machines ille-
gal, was repealed without providing the full text in the Gaming
Act.
86
The court held that when legislation purports to repeal a spe-
cific section of another bill, the section of the repealed bill must be
published, unless it is apparent from the legislation which part of
the bill is repealed." A general repeal of any inconsistent legisla-
tion in a specific statute does not violate the requirements of sec-
tion 6.' Applying these standards, the court determined that sec-
tion 1903(a)(1) of the Gaming Act violated the requirements set
forth in article III, section 6, because the full text of the section
repealed was not published. 9 Section 1903(a)(2), however, was
not violative of the constitution because that section acted as a
"general repealer" of any inconsistent legislation and was not sev-
ered from the Gaming Act."0
The last issue to be resolved by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court involved the claim of the Concerned Citizens that the en-
actment of the Gaming Act violated Article II, Section 1 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.9 The Citizens asserted that section
1506 of the Act 92 was unconstitutional because it granted imper-
83. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4-493(29) (repealed). Section 493(29) of the Liquor Code
provided that it shall be unlawful
[flor any licensee that has obtained a license to conduct thoroughbred or har-
ness horse racing meetings respectively with pari-mutuel wagering from either
the State House Racing Commission pursuant to the act of December 17, 1981
(P.L. 435, No. 135), known as the "Race Horse Industry Reform Act," and that
has obtained a slot machine license, or any employee, servant or agent of such
licensee, to give away free of charge or below cost any liquor or malt or brewed
beverage as a customary practice.
Id.
84. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 411.
85. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5513(a). Section 5513(a) provides, in part, that it is a criminal
offense for a person to "[i]ntentionally or knowingly make, assemble, set up, maintain, sell,
lend, lease, give away, or offer for sale, loan, lease or gift... any slot machine." Id.
86. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 411.
87. Id. at 412.
88. Id.
89. Id. See § 1903(a)(1), supra note 81.
90. Id. See § 1903(a)(2), supra note 81.
91. PA. CONST. art. II, § 1. Section 1 provides that "the legislative power of this Com-
monwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives." Id.
92. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1506. Section 1506, found unconstitutional in Pennsylvanians,
provided:
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missible legislative authority to the Gaming Control Board." Ac-
cording to the Concerned Citizens, the Gaming Act granted the
Board powers of a super-zoning board with no limits and unfet-
tered discretion.94 This alleged power would permit the Board to
disregard state and local zoning laws in licensing and operating
slot machine casinos throughout Pennsylvania.95 The Concerned
Citizens also contended that section 1102(10) of the Gaming Act96
offered no meaningful guidance of where to locate the casinos.97
The Commonwealth argued that section 1506 did not grant the
Gaming Control Board authority to disregard the state and local
zoning laws, but simply allowed approved licensees exemptions
from the zoning laws." The Commonwealth asserted that the li-
censing process, which included eligibility requirements, re-
stricted the authority of the Board in choosing potential sites for
the casinos.99 These restrictions granted the Board the power to
perform background checks on applicants and identify potential
criteria that the Board should consider when issuing a slot ma-
chine license. 00
The court discussed the prevailing Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cases in deciding whether the authority granted to the Gaming
Control Board constituted an unconstitutional grant of legislative
The conduct of gaming as permitted under this part, including the physical lo-
cation of any licensed facility, shall not be prohibited or otherwise regulated by
any ordinance, home rule charter provision, resolution, rule or regulation of
any political subdivision or any local or State instrumentality or authority that
relates to zoning or land use to the extent that the licensed facility has been
approved by the board. The board may, in its discretion consider such local
zoning ordinances when considering an application for a slot machine license.
The board shall provide the political subdivision, within which an applicant for
a slot machine license has proposed to locate a licensed gaming facility, a 60-
day comment period prior to the board's final approval, condition or denial of
approval of its application for a slot machine license. The political subdivision
may make recommendations to the beard for improvements to the applicant's
proposed site plans that take into account the impact on the local community,
including, but not limited to, land use and transportation impact. This section
shall also apply to any proposed racetrack or licensed racetrack.
Id.
93. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 415-16.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(10). Section 1102(10) provides that "the public interest of
the citizens of the Commonwealth and the social effect of gaming shall be taken into con-
sideration in any decision or order made pursuant to this part." Id.





101InBak12hPe spower. In Blackwell v. State Ethics Commission,"' the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court defined legislative power as "the power to
make, alter, and repeal laws.""3 The court in Blackwell also held
that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that the General As-
sembly make the basic policy choices and that any delegation of
these choices is unconstitutional.104 In Tosto v. Pennsylvania
Nursing Home Loan Agency, °5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the delegation of power to the Pennsylvania Nursing
Home Loan Agency was not unconstitutional because the law
"provides very specific definitions of pivotal statutory terms and
detailed guidelines for certain important agency decisions." 6 In
Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission,"' there was a
determination by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that broad
power could be granted to the agency so long as the legislation
contains standards to guide and restrain the functions of the
agency.' 8 While these standards must be included in the bill, Gil-
ligan held that it is not necessary to spell out all the details of the
authority granted to the agency.9
In Pennsylvanians, the court held that the delegation of power
to the Gaming Control Board by the General Assembly in section
1506 of the Gaming Act was unconstitutional."0 Section 1506 es-
tablished eligibility requirements and additional criteria with re-
spect to the issuance of licenses under the Gaming Act, but it did
not give the Gaming Control Board sufficient guidelines with re-
spect to its authority over choosing sites for slot machine casi-
nos."' The authority granted to the Board, which effectively pre-
empted local zoning ordinances, was too broad, and the court held
that section 1506 was unconstitutional and severed it from the
Gaming Act."'
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 changed many of the
legislative procedures and requirements that must be followed by
101. Id. at 415.
102. 567 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1989).
103. Blackwell, 567 A.2d at 636 (quoting In Re Marshall, 69 A.2d 619, 626 (Pa. 1949)).
104. Id. at 636-37.
105. 331 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1975).
106. Totso, 331 A.2d at 203.
107. 422 A.2d 487 (Pa. 1980).
108. Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489.
109. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 418 (quoting Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489).
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the General Assembly."' These changes, located in Article III of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, were thought necessary because of
many problems which had plagued the era, including logrolling,"'
favoritism, and bribery. '15 Article III promotes openness and ac-
countability in the General Assembly by placing restraints on the
legislative process."6 The requirements in article III include: (1)
that the original purpose of a bill cannot be changed by alteration
or amendment; (2) that the bill must contain a single-subject,
which is clearly expressed by its title; (3) each bill must be read
three times on separate days in each House of the General Assem-
bly; and (4) appropriations must be made in separate bills unless
made for purpose of public debt, public schools, or for the judicial,
legislative, or executive branches.' It has been suggested by one
scholar that these requirements are superior to those of the
United States Congress and many other states." s
Under section 3 of article III, the Pennsylvania Constitution
imposes a requirement that the General Assembly may not pass a
bill which contains more than one subject,"' and that this subject
must be clearly expressed in the title of the bill. ° This section
113. ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 295 (Murrelle Printing
Company, Inc. 1985).
114. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 62 n.250
(Ken Gormley, et al. eds., George T. Beisel Company, Inc. 2004). "Logrolling" is defined by
Professor Gormley as the "[tirading [ofl votes among special interests and legislators. One
group - and their legislators - would support another group's special legislation in ex-
change for the other special interest's support in return." Id.
115. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 295.
116. AFL-CIO ex rel. George v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 917, 923 (Pa. 2000). The court
explained that the purpose of Article III is "to place restraints on the legislative process and
encourage an open, deliberative and accountable government." AFL-CIO ex rel. George, 757
A.2d at 923.
117. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 295-98. Woodside suggested that "[tihe basic provi-
sions for the enactment of legislation by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania are con-
tained in the first six sections of article III of the Constitution. The procedure is quite
different and far superior to that of Congress and many other states." Id. at 295.
118. Id. at 295.
119. Payne v. School District of Coudersport, 31 A. 1072 (Pa. 1895). The court defined
subject as:
Those things which have a "proper relation to each other," which fairly consti-
tute parts of a scheme to accomplish a single general purpose, "relate to the
same substance" or "object." And provisions which have no proper legislative
relation to each other, and are not part of the same legislative scheme, may not
be joined in the same act
Payne, 31 A. at 1072.
120. PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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was originally added to the constitution by amendment in 1864121
and later included in the constitution of 1874.12 Section 3 reached
its current form by amendment in 1967.12' The purpose of section
3 is to prevent the passage of omnibus bills, 124 logrolling, and the
attachment of miscellaneous provisions to bills, which would not
have enough support to pass as separate legislation.125 These pre-
ventions ensure that the public and legislators are given fair no-
tice of all provisions included in a bill.126 In determining whether
amendments to a bill comply with the single-subject requirement,
a court must determine if the additions carry out the main objec-
tive of the bill or are germane to the original title of the bill.
127
The court in City of Philadelphia noted that the application of
the germaneness test was applied strictly in the twentieth cen-
tury. 128 In the 1927 opinion of Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v.
Humphrey,129 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared the
Engineer's Licensing Act unconstitutional because the single-
subject requirement had not been met.2 ° The court held that the
bill contained two subjects because the title included regulations
covering professional engineers and land surveyors, which were
two separate professions.' This strict application of the ger-
maneness test was also followed in Yardley Mills Co. v. Bogar-
121. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 308. The original provision in the amendment to the
constitution provided that, "No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which
shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill." Id.
122. City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 586 (Pa. 2003).
123. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 308. Section 3 was amended on May 16, 1967, with
the addition of "or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof." Id.
124. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 586 (citing Charles W. Rubenhall II, Comment,
The Constitution and the Consolidated Statutes, 80 DICK. L. REV. 118, 120 (1975)). An
omnibus bill was defined by Rubenhall as "the practice of incorporating into one bill a vari-
ety of distinct and independent subjects of legislation and intentionally disguising the real
purpose of the bill by a misleading title or by the comprehensive phrase 'and for other pur-
poses.'" Rubenhall, Comment, The Constitution and the Consolidated Statutes, 80 DICK. L.
REV. at 120.
125. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 586.
126. Id.
127. Mallinger v. City of Pittsburgh, 175 A. 525, 526 (Pa. 1934).
128. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 587.
129. 136 A. 213 (Pa. 1927).
130. Woodruff, 136 A. at 217.
131. Id. at 214. The title of the Engineer's Licensing Act was,
An act to regulate the practice of the profession of engineering and of land sur-
veying; creating a state board for the registration of professional engineers and
land surveyors; defining its powers and duties; imposing certain duties upon
the commonwealth and political subdivisions thereof in connection with public
work; and providing penalties.
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dus,3 2 a 1936 decision.133 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
in Yardley that the act in question involving canal waters con-
tained three separate subjects."M Although all involved water ca-
nals in Pennsylvania, the three subjects135 were not germane
enough to each other to pass constitutional muster13
The court in City of Philadelphia further acknowledged that
while the single-subject requirement of article III, section 3 was
still in full effect, the most recent decisions have given more defer-
ence to the legislature in these matters. 13 7 The court held that def-
erence should be given to the General Assembly in allowing legis-
lation under the single-subject requirement as long as the con-
tents of the bill can be "reasonably viewed as falling under one
subject."13 18 In City of Philadelphia, the purpose of the act in dis-
pute was to amend Title 53 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes, entitled Municipal Corporations. 13 ' The Commonwealth
argued that the contents of the bill involved the single-subject of
municipalities and, thus, was constitutional under section 3 of ar-
ticle 111.140 The court, however, found that some of the provisions
affected municipalities only indirectly.' The holding continued
that, if the single-subject is only affected indirectly, the public and
132. 185 A. 218 (Pa. 1936).
133. Yardley, 185 A. at 218.
134. Id. at 220. The Act was entitled:
An Act Relieving canal corporations, owning any canals or other artificial wa-
terways constructed by the Commonwealth as parts of its public works, from
the obligation to maintain the same for transportation purposes, under certain
conditions; and authorizing such corporations to use, sell, or lease the waters of
such canals and waterways for domestic, manufacturing, commercial, and
other lawful purposes, and to use, sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the whole
or any part of the lands occupied by such canals or waterways, and the prop-
erty appurtenant thereto; and authorizing the Department of Highways to ac-
quire, by gift, all or any part of such lands, and to sell or otherwise dispose of
all or any part of such lands as shall not be needed for highway purposes.
Id. at 220 n.1.
135. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 587. The Court summarized the subjects in Yard-
ley: "the first relieved canal companies of the obligation to maintain waterways obtained
from the Commonwealth; the second granted such companies the right to sell the water for
commercial purposes; and the third authorized the Commonwealth to acquire canal lands
by gift and to sell portions of them." Id.
136. Yardley, 185 A. at 220.
137. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 587. The single-subject standard has been applied
"to validate legislation containing many different topics so long as those topics can rea-
sonably be viewed as falling under one broad subject." Id.
138. Id. at 587.
139. Id. at 571.
140. Id. at 589.
141. Id.
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legislature are not put on notice and that the bill is therefore un-
constitutional. 142
Another requirement of article III is that imposed by section 1,
which prohibits the altering or amending of the original purpose of
a bill during its passage through either House of the legislature
before becoming law.143 Article III, section 1, like the other sec-
tions in Article III adopted in the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1847 was designed to prevent legislative corruption." 4  In Con-
sumer Party v. Commonwealth, it was argued that a change in the
title of a bill was unconstitutional under article III, section 1.145
The original bill in Consumer Party purported to make some mi-
nor amendments to local laws," 6 and was later passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly as a bill setting forth compensation and salaries of
certain public officials, including the Governor and General As-
semblymen.147  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court conceded that
the change in the title of the bill was a materially different change
in the original purpose of the bill.44 However, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that there was no violation of section 1
because the title, in its final form, gave proper notice to the gen-
eral public and the legislators.
14
1
To support its holding, the court emphasized the necessity of
committees in the legislative process and the almost certainty of
material changes in a bill at these committees.5 ° The court held
that when a bill is presented in final form to both Houses with a
clearly expressed title, proper notice is given and the act is consti-
142. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 589.
143. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
144. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 330.
145. Id. at 325.
146. Id. The title of the original bill, Senate Bill 270, was "an act relating to counties of
the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth classes; amending, revising, consolidating
and changing the laws relating thereto further providing for the filling of vacancies in cer-
tain circumstances." Id.
147. Id. at 326. The amended bill, after the Committee of Conference on Senate Bill 270
was entitled:
An act establishing the salaries and compensation of certain public officials in-
cluding justices and judges of Statewide Courts, judges of courts of common
pleas, judge of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, judges of the Philadelphia
Traffic Court, district justices and the Governor, the State Treasurer, the Audi-
tor General, the Attorney General and certain other State officers and the sal-
ary and certain expenses of the members of the General Assembly; and repeal-
ing inconsistent acts.
Id.
148. Id. at 332.
149. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 335.
150. Id.
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tutional under section 1.11 There was no element of deception in
the title of the bill, which is ultimately what section 1 is employed
to protect.'52
To promote the goals of fair notice and preventing deception,
section 6 of article III sets restrictions on the General Assembly in
amending, altering, and repealing legislation. 53  In Common-
wealth v. Cooper,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deter-
mined the issue of whether a section of a law that was repealed
must be republished in full text in the repealer bill.'55 The defen-
dant in Cooper sought to reverse a conviction of selling liquor
without a license, on grounds that the act under which he was
charged violated Article III, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, because it did not include the entire text of a repealed
act.'56 The court in Cooper held that the legislature was required
to publish the full text of the new statute, not the old one, when
repealing provisions.'57
In Commonwealth v. Hallberg,5 ' the defendant was arrested in
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code for operating a motor vehicle
151. Id., overruled by Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 408-09 (Pa. 2005). As a result of the holding in Pennsylvanians,
this is no longer the standard to which article III, section 1 claims are held. Pennsylvani-
ans, 877 A.2d at 408-09. The following is the new test:
a court entertaining a challenge to legislation under Article III, Section 1 must
conduct a two-part inquiry. First, the court will consider the original purpose
of the legislation and compare it to the final purpose and determine whether
there has been an alteration or amendment so as to change the original pur-
pose. Second, a court will consider, whether in its final form, the title and con-
tents of the bill are deceptive.
Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 408-09.
152. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 335.
153. PA. CONST. art. III, § 6. Section 6 provides that "No law shall be revived, amended,
or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much
thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at
length." Id.
154. 121 A. 502 (Pa. 1923).
155. Cooper, 121 A. at 503.
156. Id. at 503.
157. Id. at 505 (citing Wilson v. Downing, 4 Pa. Super. 487, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1897)).
Wilson, citing the Ohio decision of Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573 (Ohio 1863), stated:
In the case of an amendment of a section or sections of a prior statute, that the
new act shall contain, not the section or sections which it proposes to amend,
but the section or sections in full, as it purports to amend them. That is, it re-
quires, not a recital of the old section, but a full statement, in terms, of the new
one.
Cooper, 121 A. at 505 (citing Wilson, 4 Pa. Super. at 493 (citing Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at
602)).
158. 97 A.2d 849 (Pa. 1953).
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without a permit.9 The Motor Vehicle Code described the viola-
tive conduct in subsection (a) and the penalty in subsection (b).16°
Subsection (a) was amended in a new act and republished, while
subsection (b) remained the same, but was not republished.' The
defendant challenged his conviction under article III, section 6 on
the grounds that the section in which the penalty for the violation
was located was not republished upon amendment of the act.'62
The court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution required the
entire section of the act to be republished at length, and reversed
the conviction.'63
While Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution focuses on
the procedures the General Assembly must follow in enacting leg-
islation, article II outlines the organization of the General Assem-
bly." Article II, section 1165 grants the General Assembly legisla-
tive power, the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. 6 Much
litigation has arisen concerning section 1 and its relationship with
the separation of powers.'67 Under the structure of Pennsylvania,
legislative power must remain with the legislature and cannot be
granted or delegated to the judiciary or executive branches of gov-
ernment. 68
In an 1847 decision, Parker v. Commonwealth,'69 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania determined whether a local referendum,
which enabled the people of the Commonwealth to accept or reject
certain provisions of a bill, was an unconstitutional grant of legis-
lative power. 170 The referendum in question involved allowing the




163. Id. at 852.
164. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 245.
165. PA. CONST. art. II, § 1. Section 1 provides, "The legislative power of this Common-
wealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives." Id.
166. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 246 (citing Mt. Lebanon v. County Board of Election
of Allegheny County, 368 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa. 1977)).
167. WOODSIDE, supra note 113, at 246.
168. Id.
169. 6 Pa. 507 (Pa. 1847).
170. Parker, 6 Pa. at 507. The Parker court explained the difference between the federal
government and that of Pennsylvania, stating that
[u]nlike that of the United States, the government of Pennsylvania is not one of
enumerated powers. Still, it is a government of limited authority; and it is,
therefore, not to be denied that the action of its legislature may be invalid,
though it contravene no express provision of the constitution, if it be in viola-
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people of different wards an opportunity to vote on the passage of
legislation. 7' The court held that it was an unconstitutional grant
of legislative power to allow the people of Pennsylvania to deter-
mine whether to pass the legislation.'72 The people had already
granted the power to the General Assembly in section 1; therefore,
it could not be delegated back to the people without violating sec-
tion 1.17
The issue as to the delegation of legislative power arose again in
Appeal of Locke,'74 an 1873 opinion.175 In Locke, the legislature
sought to allow electors to vote for or against the issuance of li-
censes to sell liquor.176 The court held that, while the legislature
cannot delegate its law-making power, it can delegate determina-
tions of facts or the state of things to which the law is contin-
gent.7 7 In this case, all that was delegated to the people was a
vote of whether or not a license should be issued. 17' The voting
terms were included in the law and the consequences of the result
of the vote sprang from the law. 79 The legislature then did not
delegate its power to make laws, but only gave the people a choice
of a fact or state of things from which the results of the law
flowed. 
18
The delegation of legislative powers to the Department of Labor
and Industry was examined in Holgate Brothers v. Bashore' in
1938.1" At issue was the 44-Hour Week Law, which limited the
weekly hours that employees could work in Pennsylvania.8 3 The
dispute arose over a provision in the act that gave the Department
of Labor and Industry and the Labor Board broad discretion, al-
tion of the spirit of the instrument, and the genius of the public institutions de-





174. 72 Pa. 491 (Pa. 1873).
175. Locke, 72 Pa. at 491.
176. Id. at 494.
177. Id. at 498. Justice Agnew stated, "The legislature cannot delegate its power to
make law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend." Id.
178. Id. at 498.
179. Id.
180. Locke, 72 Pa. at 498.
181. 200 A. 672 (Pa. 1938).
182. Holgate, 200 A. at 674.
183. Id. The 44 Hour Week Law provided in part that "the Department of Labor and
Industry, with the approval of the Industrial Board, may make, alter, amend and repeal
general rules and regulations prescribing variations from said schedule of hours." Id.
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lowing these entities to make alterations to the general rules set
forth in the Act."M Consistent with Locke, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Holgate held that the legislature could confer on a
department power to find facts essential to the operation of the
law.185 The 44-Hour Week Law was found by the court to be un-
constitutional because it granted the departments the power to
make, alter, amend, and repeal the rules of the act.186
The law in this area today was summarized by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Gilligan v. Horse Racing Commission:87
while the legislature cannot delegate its legislative power, it may,
in connection with the execution of the law, confer authority and
discretion upon another branch of government." Within this
granted authority, the legislature must make the basic policy
choices and the legislation must give guidance and restrain the
branch to which the authority is delegated. 89  In Gilligan, the
Jockey's Guild, Inc. challenged the constitutionality of a decision
by the Horse Racing Commission pursuant to the Horse Racing
Act to promulgate a new fee schedule which determined the com-
pensation of jockeys. 90 The challengers argued that the determi-
nation was outside the authority of the Horse Racing Commis-
sion."' Applying the above standard, the court in Gilligan deter-
mined that the Horse Racing Commission acted well within its
broad general supervisory powers in creating the fee schedule and
those powers were constitutionally granted to the Commission by
the legislature. 9
The holding in Pennsylvanians should not be surprising, as it
follows the historical trend in the Commonwealth of granting wide
deference to the General Assembly in enacting legislation. The
issue then arises as to whether greater deference is given at the
184. Id. at 674.
185. Id. at 675. The court stated,
The legislature may, however, leave to administrative officers, boards and
commissions, the duty to determine whether the facts exist to which the law is
itself restricted. In all such occasions, nevertheless, the legislative body must
surround such authority with definite standards, policies and limitations to
which such administrative officers, boards or commissions, must strictly ad-
here and by which they are strictly governed.
Id.
186. Id. at 679.
187. 422 A.2d 487 (Pa. 1980).
188. Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 488.
191. Id. at 489.
192. Id. at 491.
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expense of the underlying purpose of Article III of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, which is to promote openness and accountabil-
ity of the General Assembly throughout the legislative process.
These goals are maintained by the legislature when fair notice of a
bill is given to all legislators and the public at large.
The wide latitude given to the General Assembly is apparent in
Pennsylvanians. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
General Assembly could constitutionally pass a bill, which went
from a one-page directive to the state police in performing back-
ground checks on horseracing license applicants, to a 145-page
authorization of slot machine casinos throughout the Common-
wealth.9 This is constitutionally possible because of the broad
interpretation of the original purpose and single-subject require-
ments imposed by the court. Pennsylvanians permits these re-
quirements set forth in article III, sections 1 and 3, respectively, to
be met under the all-encompassing topic of the regulation of gam-
ing.
At first glance, it appears that the court further restricted the
General Assembly under article III, section 1, by developing a new
test to determine constitutionality.9 This test is undermined,
however, by the broad interpretation of the original purpose of the
bill. After Consumer Party, in determining whether the original
purpose of a bill has changed, the court based its determination on
viewing the bill only in its final form, not on comparing it to its
original form.'96
In Pennsylvanians, the court reinterpreted article III, section 1
and implemented a new two-prong analysis that requires courts to
compare the purpose of the bill in its original form against its final
form and to determine if the change in titles is deceptive.'97 The
court also held that the original purpose of the bill should be
viewed broadly. 99 The court reasoned that the purpose of a bill
will almost always materially change due to the complexities of
the legislative process.'99 In support of this proposition, the court
193. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 392.
194. Id. at 383. See PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3.
195. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 406. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
196. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 335.
197. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 408-09.
198. Id. at 409.
199. Id.
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emphasized the important role of joint committees in molding leg-
islation before a bill reaches its final passage. °
By construing the original purpose of the bill broadly, the court
allowed the General Assembly and the Governor in Pennsylvani-
ans to completely change legislation without having to meet all of
the requirements of a new bill. H.B. 2330 was written with the
purpose of increasing the requirements of applicants for horse rac-
ing licenses. The Gaming Act, as passed by the legislature, (1)
authorizes the creation of slot machine casinos throughout Penn-
sylvania, and (2) creates the Gaming Control Board to govern the
casinos.201 The change in the Gaming Act from its inception was
more than material; it was complete. The Gaming Act is essen-
tially a new bill, and it should be treated as such by the legislature
in order to properly give fair notice as required to the general pub-
lic and the legislators.
The two-prong analysis does not represent much of a shift by
the court, because the original purpose of the bill is determined
after the final bill has already been passed. The purpose, there-
fore, is hardly original; rather, it is a post-legislation pronounce-
ment to comply with the requirements of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution. Under the rationale set forth by Chief Justice Cappy, a
multitude of provisions could have been added to H.B. 2330 while
maintaining the general topic of gaming regulation.Y Some ac-
tivities that could fall under the regulation of gaming include vir-
tually any type of casino game, sports wagering, and a transfor-
mation of the Pennsylvania Turnpike into the Las Vegas Strip.
The holding in Pennsylvanians also did not uphold the underly-
ing purpose of article III, because the broad interpretation of the
original purpose and single-subject allowed the Gaming Act to
swiftly pass through the legislature in five days. 23  The bill was
amended by the House on Thursday and passed on Saturday, then
passed by the Senate on Sunday, and signed into law by Governor
Rendell on Monday.204 The public was not given fair notice as the
new bill was passed over the weekend, without the required en-
actment procedures. The passage of the bill also did not promote
openness and accountability of the General Assembly, as it was
200. Id.
201. Id. at 392.
202. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 409.
203. Id. at 393.
204. Id. at 391.
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permitted to operate in a swift manner, protecting it from public
scrutiny.
While there are some criticisms of the decisions regarding the
disposition of the article III issues in the case, Chief Justice Cappy
properly upheld precedent in the decision of the article II, section
205 stn1 issue. The standard to apply was formulated in Gilligan: The
General Assembly cannot delegate its law-making power, but can
confer authority and discretion on other branches of government
with regards to the execution of the law.206 The court in Pennsyl-
vanians decided that the delegation of duties by the General As-
sembly to the Gaming Control Board was an unconstitutional
grant of legislative power, and it severed section 1506 from the
Gaming Act."7 The standard under Gilligan was upheld because
the Gaming Control Board was given wide discretion over the lo-
cations chosen to host the slot machine casinos, but was given lit-
tle, if any, guidance in how to make these decisions.0 8 Section
1506 would have permitted the Gaming Control Board to make
the basic policy decisions of the legislative branch and not simply
the authority to execute the laws.
Aside from two collateral issues, which included the delegation
of power to the Gaming Control Board and appropriations unre-
lated to gaming, the Gaming Act was generally upheld by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pennsylvanians."9 While the im-
pact on future legislation appears to be minimal, the outcome of
the case should have a large economic impact. The projected
revenues and potential benefits of the slot machine casinos vary,
depending on the source of the information. Regardless of the
economic impact, one thing is certain: as a result of the holding in
Pennsylvanians, citizens of the Commonwealth will soon have an
increased opportunity to gamble within its borders.
Brian D. Kravetz
205. PA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
206. Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489.
207. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 418.
208. Gilligan, 422 A.2d at 489.
209. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 383.

